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The present paper discusses the military tactics of early medieval pastoral no-
mads. In my discussion I rely on three sources; the Eastern Roman Emperor Mau-
rice's references to the Western Türks preserved in his Strategikon, which is, in 
turn, also preserved in the text of the Tactics written by Maurice's successor, Leon 
the Wise, and the imperial address of the Chinese Emperor Sui Wen-ti to his 
troops fighting the Western Türks, which is preserved in the Sui-shu. 
Nomadic warfare is usually depicted as comprising of tactical retreats forcing 
the enemy troops to launch an attack as well as of a masterly use of archery to 
stop and annihilate them. However, it is evident from these three texts that, dur-
ing the period of the sixth to the eighth century CE, body-to-body fighting with 
lances, bows and swords was also an important part of the Türks' tactics not only 
against other nomadic peoples, but also against the armies of their sedentary 
neighbours. 
Describing the life and fights of its main hero, the Kül Tegin inscription very 
frequently uses the expression oplayu tägdi. Clauson defines it as 'to attack pant-
ing with fury', and derives it from the Kirghiz op 'a sigh' and Turkish ufla- 'to 
ejaculate uf.1 Talät Tekin gives no standard translation. Sometimes he translates 
this expression merely as 'attacked' (I E 36) or 'rushed and attacked' (I E 32), or 
'attacked suddenly' (I E 3; I E 5).2 
The situations described in the Kül Tegin inscription where this expression 
occurs are as follows: 
1 G. Clauson, An Etymological Dictionary of the Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish, Oxford 
1972,11. 
2 If not shown otherwise, with some slight changes in transcription, I follow the stan-
dard edition given in T. Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic, Indiana University Publi-
cations, Uralic and Altaic Series 69, The Hague 1968, 231-292. 
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tagdi oplayu tagdi 
E 37-38* binip tagdi 'mounted and 
attacked', captured firstly two 
Turges warriors, then the eltdbdr of 
the Az, who was a buyruq of the 
Turges qayan 
E 40 [against the TurgeS] binip tag-
mis 'mounted and attacked', he 
killed and subjugated the common 
Turges people 
E 32-33 [against Caca sarjiin] binip E 32 [against the Tabyac 013 tutuq] yadayin 
tagdi 'mounted and attacked' oplayu tagdi orj tutuq yurcin yaraqliy aligin 
tudti'rushed and attacked on foot' (in 
Tekin's translation), he took the Governor's 
brother-in-law prisoner 
E 36 [against the Kirghiz] binip oplayu tagdi 
'attacked' (in Tekin's translation), he hit one 
man with an arrow and stabbed two men 
through the thighs 
N 2 [against the Qarluq] oplayu tagdi eki arig 
ud asru sancdi'attacked suddenly' (in 
Tekin's translation), he stabbed two men 
through the thighs 
N 3 [against the Az] oplayu tagdi az eltabdrig 
aligin tutdi"attacked suddenly', he took the 
governor of the Az (people) prisoner 
N 4* [against the Izgil] 'attacked suddenly' 
N 6 [against the Oyuz] binip N 5-6 [against the Adiz] 'attacked sud-
tagdi,sancdi mounted, attacked and denly', he stabbed one man with a lance 
stabbed (the enemy) with a lance and struck nine men, turning them around 
and around 
N 8* [against the Oyuz] binip tagdi 
eki arig sancdi b[aliq(q)]a b[as]iqdi 
'mounted and attacked', he 
stabbed two men and thrust them 
into mud (?) 
The text deliberately differentiates between the situations that have tagdi 'he 
attacked' and those that have oplayu tagdi. The latter nearly always refers to body-
to-body fighting when the hero wounded, killed or captured his personal enemy. 
This is not to take into consideration such personifications as: 'he killed and sub-
jugated the common Turges people', E 40; or 'stabbed [the enemy] with a lance'. 
The only exception is in IN 4 ('attacked suddenly'), which, however might re-
fer to the hero's fall from his horse during the battle. Otherwise, when the text 
says that Ktil Tegin attacked (tagdi), he could merely be leading his retinue into 
battle. It is also worth mentioning that tagdi ('he attacked') usually features in a 
phrase with the verbal stem bin- ('to mount'), as, for example, in the construction 
binip tagdi ('he mounted and attacked'). In these cases the horse of the hero is also 
described in detail. There are two cases (I E 37-38 and IN 8) when a body-to-body 
battle is referred to as tagdi and not oplayu tagdi. In one case, narrating the last 
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fight of Kül Tegin, the text is binip toquz ärän sancd 'mounted (...), stabbed nine 
men' (I N 9). We can surmise that the phrase oplayu täg- or even (h)oplayu täg- is 
an onomatopoeical expression meaning 'to jump into the battle, to enter body-to-
body fight'. These battle-scenes clearly show that attacking face-to-face and fight-
ing body-to-body were the most widespread methods of combat. 
According to our sources, as well as archaeological evidence, the majority if 
not all of the Turkic cavalry were armoured.3 There are indeed a lot of expres-
sions concerning armour. In the Orkhon inscriptions, we find yariq/yaraq,4 yalma, 
and as our colleague László Keller has shown, kädim, which is frequent in the 
Uighur inscriptions. There, however, it refers to horses, while in Orkhon Turkic it 
can also mean 'armour'.5 
We are not fully convinced that Sinor was right to suppose that the famous 
passage in the Tonyuquq inscription, eki iilügi atliy ärti bir ülügi yada y ärti{T I W 4), 
gives us a permanent proportion of the Turkic army.6 The whole narrative of the 
events that lead to the restoration of the Eastern Turkic Qaghanate is completely 
fabulous; it exaggerates the pains of the Turks who remained independent after 
the collapse of the earlier revolts between 679 and 681. There were 700 of them, 
which is evidently a mythological number; they were hiding in the steppes. This 
narrative provides us with no evidence in support of Sinor's idea. Of course, as 
becomes clear from a particular passage of the Kül Tegin inscription (I E 32), the 
Türks could equally fight as infantry, but they were mostly a cavalry force. 
The equestrian tactics of the Turks aroused the attention of their contemporar-
ies. The first work to give a detailed description of their military virtues is the 
famous Strategikon (II, 1) attributed to the Eastern Roman Emperor Maurice (582-
602). Criticizing the Roman and Persian military commanders of his own age, he 
writes as follows: 
With this in mind the older military writers organized their armies into droun-
goi, divisions and moiras of varying strength as conditions dictated, just as the 
3 J. G. Mahler, The Westerners among the figurines of the Tang-Dynasty. Serie Orientalie 
Roma XX, Rome 1959, 22, Table IX; K. U. Kőhalmi, A steppék nomádja lóháton fegyverben 
[The pastoral nomads of the steppes, mounted and armoured] Körösi Csorna Kis-
könyvtár 12, Budapest 1972,116-118,123-124; E. Nowgorodova, Alte Kunst der Mongo-
léi. Leipzig 1980, 213; I. Kozhamberdiyev and Yu. Khudyakov, Reconstruction of Ancient 
Turkic Armour from Sary-Djon Monument, UNESCO, International Association for the 
Study of the Cultures of Central Asia, Information Bulletin, Issue 17, Moscow 1990, 5 7 -
62; С. Г. Кляшторный-Д. Г. Савинов, Степные империи древней Евразии, Санктпетер-
бург 2005, 100-101 (Pictures 10, 11); L. Keller, "Türk harcos és fegyverei az írott for-
rások tükrében," [Turkic warrior and his arms in the mirror of written sources], in 
L. Balogh and L. Keller, eds. Fegyveres nomádok, nomád fegyverek, Magyar Őstörténeti 
Könyvtár 21, Budapest 2004, 45-52. 
4 According to Kásyarí/ Rif cat Ш. 12, Kásyarí/Atalay Ш 15; later this expression could 
also mean 'weapon'. 
5 Keller, "Türk harcos", 47. 
6 D. Sinor, "Horse and pasture in Inner Asian history," Oriens Extremus 19 (1972), 173. La-
ter, independent of Sinor, this idea was also proposed by Keller, "Türk harcos," 46-47. 
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Avars and Turks line up today keeping themselves in that formation, so they can 
be quickly called to support any unit that may give way in battle. For they do not 
draw themselves up in one battle line only, as do the Romans and Persians, stak-
ing the fate of tens of thousands of horsemen on a single throw. But they form 
two, sometimes even three lines, distributing the units in depth, especially when 
their troops are numerous, and they can easily undertake any sort of action.7 
This was the strategic background of the tactics of the Turks in late sixth-
century Eastern Roman eyes. The outlook of their tactics can be found in a well-
known later passage of this work (XI, 2) : 
They prefer to prevail over their enemies not so much by force as by deceit, 
surprise attacks, and cutting off supplies.8 
Their weaponry is depicted thus: 
They are armed with mail, sword, bow and lances. In combat most of them at-
tack doubly armed; lances slung over their shoulders and holding bows in their 
hands, they make use of both as need requires. Not only do they armor themselves, 
but in addition the horses of their illustrious men are covered in front with iron or 
felt. They give special attention to training archery on horseback.9 
Another passage discusses how they engage in battle: 
In combat they do not, as do the Romans and Persians, form their battle line in 
three parts, but in several units of irregular size, all joined closely together to give 
the appearance of one long battle line. Separate from their main formation, they 
have an additional force which they can send out to ambush a careless adversary or 
hold in reserve to aid a hard-pressed section. (...) They prefer battles fought at long 
range, ambushes, encircling their adversaries, simulated retreats and sudden re-
turns, and wedge-shaped formations, that is, in scattered groups.10 
The Turks sometimes suffer from shortages: 
They are hurt by a shortage of fodder which can result from the huge number 
of horses they bring with them. Also in the event of battle, when opposed by an in-
fantry force in close formation, they stay on horses and do not dismount, for they 
do not last long fighting on foot. They have been brought up on horseback, and ow-
ing to their lack of exercise they simply cannot walk about on their feet.11 
The learned emperor also gives advice on how to fight against them: 
Level, unobstructed ground should be chosen, and a cavalry force should ad-
vance against them in a dense, unbroken mass to engage them in hand-to-hand 
7 Maurice's Strategikon. Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, tr. G. T. Dennis, Philadel-
phia 1984, henceforth Strategikon/Dennis, 23. For the original Greek text with a Ger-
man translation, see: Das Strategikon des Maurikios. ed. G. T. Dennis, tr. E. Gamillscheg, 
Vienna 1981 (henceforth Strategikon/Dennis-Gamillscheg), 110, 112 (original), 111, 113 
(German translation). 
8 Strategikon/Dennis, 116; Strategikon/Dennis-Gamillscheg, 362 (original), 363 (German 
translation). 
9 Strategikon/Dennis, 116-117; Strategikon/Dennis-Gamillscheg, 362 (original), 363 (Ger-
man translation). 
10 Strategikon/Dennis, 117; Strategikon/Dennis-Gamillscheg 362, 364 (original), 363, 365 
(German translation). 




fighting. Night attacks are also effective, with part of our force maintaining its for-
mation while the other lies in ambush.12 
It is also worth mentioning that according to our Eastern Roman author the 
tactics of the Türks and of the Avars were definitely better than those of other 
pastoral nomads.13 
A comparison of these instructions with the Orkhon inscriptions clearly shows 
that, when fighting against their nomadic and sedentary neighbours, the Türks 
made use of the same methods that the Byzantine author supposed to be success-
ful against them. Breaking into the lines of the enemy, forcing hand-to-hand 
fighting, and night attacks were the most common methods the Türks used in 
combat. 
Maurice, however, was not the only imperial majesty who recorded his ex-
periences about fighting the Türks. His near contemporary, the Chinese emperor 
Sui Yang-ti (581-605), in 583 issued an imperial address to his troops concerning 
the Türks.14 According to this address, the classical limes strategy (dislocating the 
troops by posting them to far remote garrisons along a long and almost uncon-
trollable border) is unsuccessful. Therefore, he continues, the Chinese should take 
the initative and carry the war into the steppes, directly attacking the enemy. 
During the years to come, the emperor and his commanders were successful in 
doing so. Taking advantage also of the internal calamities of the A-shih-na tribe 
of the Türks, they were able to subjugate the Türks, previously the dreaded ene-
mies of the Middle Kingdom. 
In conclusion, we can state that, aside from ambushes and simulated retreats, 
hand-to-hand warfare was the most effective tactic against not only the nomads, 
but this was also a tactic the nomads themselves deployed against their enemies, 
both nomadic and sedentary. The term oplayu tägdi describes moments when the 
Turkic warriors attacked hand-to-hand (mostly with bows and lances, as becomes 
clear from the Byzantine and Old Turkic sources), when fighting a real decisive 
battle. 
12 Strategikon/Dennis, 118; SfrafegtTcon/Dennis-Gamillscheg, 364, 366 (original), 365, 367 
(German translation). 
13 Strategikon/Dennis, 116; Strategikon/Dennis-Gamillscheg, 360 (original), 361. 
1 4 Liu Mau-tsai: Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (T'u-küe). 
Wiesbaden, 1958.1-II., 4 5 ^ 9 . 
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